In particular, I found the following paragraph by David Naylor gets at the (or one of the) heart(s) of the matter:
"There is now hard evidence that suggests all of those blows that thrill us as we watch from our couches have come at a price for the athletes participating, and that price can be steep, indeed."
Here's the link to the TSN webpage.
- Diego
A number of issues here. Indeed, quite a large number.
ReplyDeleteOne that strikes me, as I sit here waiting for mý bus after engaging in a solid hour of controlled violence myself, is the following. There is no denying it that, at least for what seems to be the majority (of mostly males) violence is an undeniable source of excitement and, dare I say it, primal pleasure. History of martial sports are on my side here, I think.
The question, if I can ask it, is this: is it an ethical attitude to have? That is, can we say that deriving pleasure from either witnessing or even participating in violence is some that is compatible with being a virtuous or moral person? Is it ethical of us to be "thrilled" as we sit on our couches watching yet another brawl on the ice or a merciless check?
So, yeah, I love good consensual, socially sanctioned violence like any other person (primarily men, maybe - though biologically or culturally dictated or both?)
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure what it would mean, though, for it to be an ethical attitude. So it seems that if we're 'hardwired' to like violence, then there's really no volition relationship toward violence, and hence, I can't see why we would be morally praiseworthy for having it. On the other hand, if there is a propensity, but it is not a necessary part of human neurobiology, then I think we can question it, that is, the virtue of having this drive. This doesn't totally answer the question you present; in fact, it raises (at least) a further question, namely, what is the moral standing of actions that are propensities (because of nature or nurture) but are not necessities? What are their moral standing?
And so the discussion takes off.
ReplyDeleteI did not necessarily mean to say that we are "hardwired" to like violence, although I do think that there are some such inherent characteristics. Be that as it may, I do think that even if we are inherently predisposed to like violence, it can still be the case (and I think it is the case) that we can actively work to minimize this disposition. I do not take to the dichotomy view of Nature vs. Nurture, one or the other. Except for some very basic elements of our psychology most of our behaviors and settled dispositions are a complex product of both Nature and Nurture.
The point I was trying to raise was not so much whether our liking violence is to be praised, rather it was whether it is something that should be a point of moral shame and (self)condemnation. It seems to me that morality in general has a somewhat pacifistic tendency, in that it generally tends to minimize violence and aggression between moral agents whenever possible. As such, I was wondering whether being a morally upright person was in tension with our observed tendency to enjoy displays of violence between other members of the moral community (is the case different when its 'lower' animals that are being aggressive and violent towards other animals?) If there is an inconsistency there, then it seems to me we can argue for a kind of duty to strive to change our attitude to displays of violence and aggression.
Your own question, Diego, is interesting. My tentative answer would be that actions that are not in some robust sense necessary (and thus inevitable and unavoidable), then they fall within the framework of moral judgment along the lines of the three basic moral categories of Forbidden, Permissible, Required. I'm not sure if this answers the question, but to apply this thought to the case of enjoying sport violence, I would argue that it is something that we should be morally permitted to do, provided some basic parameters around consent and extreme violence are in place. That it should be uniformly required, and hence that one ought to cultivate and enhance one's derivation of this kind of pleasure, or that it should be forbidden, and hence one ought to work towards eliminating or countering the pleasurable aspect of such an experience, seems to me to be both overly demanding and unjustified.
Cheers,
Dmitri
Yeah, so I misunderstood your first post (my apologies). I agree with your first two paragraphs.
ReplyDeleteAs to the third paragraph, you wrote: "I would argue that it is something that we should be morally permitted to do, provided some basic parameters around consent and extreme violence are in place." To me granting the consent issue is an obvious one (though not so much the voluntary, but let's assume it's also voluntary). The trick is what constitutes 'extreme violence'. I don't purport to know where to draw the line. The only thing I'll reiterate from my original post on self-head punchers, is that (i) the brain's important; (ii) busting up your brain is bad for your health; and (iii) it's morally irrelevant whether or not you can see someone's brain bleed and being damaged. So do sports that have a lot of concussions inherently 'extremely violent', I dunno. Is the word 'violence' too loaded for this debate? If so, what can we use? Again, I stayed away from the word 'violent' (or tried to) in my original post. I dunno. I will say that I want to continue watching football and boxing - I really enjoy that shit!
Nuances abound.
ReplyDeleteBut I am puzzled by this statement: "(iii) it's morally irrelevant whether or not you can see someone's brain bleed and being damaged."
I take it you mean something more than the mere capacity to see this kind injury. But beyond that I do not get your meaning.